Chris Grayling

7 May 2009

Chris Grayling (Epsom and Ewell) (Con): May I begin by offering two different sets of thanks? The first is to all the people who work in our security services. I am sure every Member of this House would agree that they do a magnificent job for this country. We depend on them enormously at what is a time of great threat and great difficulty, and it is right and proper that our gratitude should go out to them. My second set of thanks is to the right hon. Member for Pontypridd (Dr. Howells) and his colleagues of all political parties who serve on the Intelligence and Security Committee. They too do a very important job of work for us; they carry out a challenging and important role on our behalf. That fact is underlined by the scale of the redacted information in this report. That inevitably makes it difficult for this House to have a full discussion about the scale of our commitment to the security services, so we rely on the ISC to be our eyes and ears in the security world, and I am grateful to the Chairman and his Committee for what they have done. I am sure we would also want to pass on our thanks to the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Margaret Beckett) for her work on the Committee during the course of the year.

There is, of course, one element missing from the report. We have an annual report to consider, and we will spend today’s discussion focusing on a document that has been thoughtfully put together, but which inevitably lacks some of the detail that might enable our debate to be more informed. Obviously, for security reasons key information cannot be made available to us. We can certainly discuss the role of our security services in the battle against terror, but one issue that I know will be followed from outside this House is the work carried out by the Committee on the London 7/7 bombings, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. We know that the research it conducted and the assessments it made have remained under lock and key because of the trial that has recently concluded. Even given the fact that that trial has now ended, we would all fully accept that the Committee has been given access to some of the most sensitive information in relation to what happened and that it will not be possible to make that information fully public.

However, I think Members in all parts of the House will be aware that there is an expectation among the families of those who were killed or injured that the report will be published in some form, and I think they will welcome the announcement the right hon. Gentleman has made today. They are certainly hoping that the report will give them some further explanation about what happened, and in particular what was known about the bombers. I have a clear sense from talking to some of those involved that they do not want there to be a blame witch hunt against anyone who may have made mistakes, but they do want clear evidence that lessons have been learned and procedures improved. All of us in this House can understand that desire, and we can only have the greatest admiration for the way in which the surviving victims and their families have dealt with the appalling situation they faced.

Mr. Michael Mates (East Hampshire) (Con): I must be careful about what I say, but I can tell my hon. Friend that we have made huge efforts in this report to cut redactions to a minimum for the express purpose of trying to give as much information as we possibly can to the families and relatives he was talking about.

Chris Grayling: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for those comments and I am sure they will be welcomed by the families, who are certainly seeking reassurance that everything possible is being done to ensure that no one has to face a similar tragic situation in the future. There is a duty on us to provide answers for those people as far as we can, with the caveat that we cannot compromise the future ability of the security services to combat the threat we face. I am sure that the families will be reassured by my right hon. Friend’s comments, and I am delighted to hear that the Committee will be able to press ahead and publish that report. I hope that it provides the families with some of the answers they seek.

Andrew Mackinlay: Before the hon. Gentleman gets carried away in mutual congratulations between Front Benchers and prospective Privy Counsellors, I draw his attention to page 25 of the report, which states:

“SIS has now implemented the new civil service retirement age of 65 with the exception of senior staff...where the retirement age remains ***.”

I find it incredible that that detail was of such importance to national security that it had to be left out. That is absurd, and it insults Parliament. I imagine some sort of Miles Malleson or Wilfrid Hyde-White character still in post at 106, and they are too embarrassed to say so. That is the only logical conclusion to draw.

Chris Grayling: The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point and I was about to mention the scale of redaction. I remember dealing with a constituency case a few years ago in which an experienced counter-terrorism officer was being expected to retire because there was a set retirement age. At a time when we face a significant international threat, it is clearly bonkers to lose expertise unless people really want to retire—

Andrew Mackinlay: How old was this guy?

Chris Grayling: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will have a chance to ask the Home Secretary or a member of the Committee whether they can give him some hint on that.

Because of the need to avoid compromising the ability of our security services to defend the safety of our citizens, the detail in the report will always have to be limited, but we need to ask serious questions about the scale of the redactions. It is impossible for Parliament sensibly to debate value for money as most of the figures are replaced with asterisks. On page 13 there is even a footnote for the asterisks that explains helpfully:

“This relates to GCHQ’s various activities ***.”

That is not very helpful or enlightening. On page 9, a whole table is printed showing the overall resource and capital spending projections for the different agencies, but no amounts for each agency. I can see why it is important that information that is a threat to national security is not placed in the public domain, but I wonder whether the degree of redaction in this report allows Parliament to fulfil its role as examiners of the public purse. That is especially true given that the agencies are costing more and more to run.

For GCHQ, the SIS, the Security Service and what are termed “Additional elements”, spending over the five years to 2011 will almost double from £1.2 billion to just over £2 billion. In total, spending on counter-terrorism will increase to £3.5 billion. What was originally a relatively small item of Government expenditure is expanding steadily to the point where it is close to the size of a small Department on its own. Clearly, we should not know or expose the full detail of that expenditure, and we face new challenges—the report rightly points out that the increased use of the internet by terrorists has become a priority for GCHQ, which will create a whole new set of challenges, requirements and investment needs. We accept also that the security services are operating in a difficult environment, but there are legitimate questions to ask about the overall value for money being obtained by them.

Mr. Winnick: Perhaps the Chairman of the Committee believes that I would like to see much of its work done in public, but nothing could be further from the truth. Is it the Opposition’s view that there is a public role for the Committee, including justification for some public hearings, to make it—in the words of the Prime Minister—more akin to a Select Committee, while recognising that we face an acute terrorist danger and much of the Committee’s work must, by the very nature of such things, be private?

Chris Grayling: We certainly support as much transparency as possible but while still allowing the Committee to work effectively, and in a way that does not compromise our national security and the work of those who are, in very many cases, putting their lives on the line to defend us. It is a delicate balance. I look to the Committee to try to push the margin as far as it reasonably can. It is closest to the information with which we are dealing and involves representatives from both sides of the House. I hope—I suspect that this is the wish of everyone in the House—that we will push the envelope as far as we can to achieve a sensible balance.

Mr. Ancram: For four years, I made the same speech as my hon. Friend is making from that Dispatch Box. I too used to run through the redactions and ask how we could possibly do our job in Parliament when we could not see the figures. I have now served on the ISC for three years and have been taken through the reasons for the redactions, and so, without giving anything away, may I say to him that I think they are justified?

Chris Grayling: I accept my right hon. and learned Friend’s word in these matters. However, I am sure that he and his colleagues on the Committee will continue to make every effort to bring into the public domain matters that can be brought into it.

We know that a considerable amount of investment is taking place in IT across the security services, for reasons such as the increased use of the internet to which I have just referred. We also know that the Government have, on occasions, got things spectacularly wrong in IT across all different aspects of the public sector. The report quite rightly raises serious questions about the SCOPE project, which has clearly been another example of an unsuccessful major IT project. It is clear that that is a situation in which it is helpful for the House to hear as much as possible about how the Committee ensures that money is spent wisely and that we genuinely secure value for the investment, as well as what we do when things go badly wrong. I await with the interest the report that the right hon. Member for Pontypridd talked about putting together later in the year.

Therein lies the rub. I hear what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) says, but people standing at this Dispatch Box—including him and my predecessor, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve)—have argued that there is more scope to provide information to support the value for money issues, that not all the information needs to be classified and that we could demonstrate to the House and to taxpayers how we are securing a proper return for the taxpayer in what is inevitably now proving to be a fast-increasing investment for the taxpayer.

There is a balance to be struck. If we publish breakdowns that are too detailed, it gives those who are hostile to this nation information about where and when budgets are squeezed and about the areas in which we are investing and those in which we are not. Yes, there is a risk that we might give an indication of where the soft underbelly lies. Clearly, we do not want to do that, but I still suspect that more information could be provided without exposing us in that way. Of course, if we understand where there are pressures in the system and where there are financial issues, it makes it easier for right hon. and hon. Members to apply pressure and to that soft underbellies do not appear to the extent that they might otherwise.

Let me now turn to some of the other detail of the report, which seems to confirm what my colleagues and I have said all along: the Government’s national security strategy is in danger of simply being a descriptive laundry list and the Prime Minister’s National Security Committee and National Security Forum are in danger of just being talking shops.

The Committee’s report makes it clear that the Government have not taken the recommendations of the Butler report seriously, which could negatively affect the functioning of the central intelligence machinery and our analytical capability. It worryingly calls into question the Government’s ability to find a way to allow intercept evidence to be used in terrorist trials—we have argued for that in order to reduce our reliance on the control orders regime. The report also highlights the costly failure of the SCOPE project, as I mentioned earlier, and reinforces our calls for a full, evidence-based review of the Prevent strategy.

Let me deal with some of the criticisms in turn. First, the Committee placed a question mark over the value of the national security strategy, saying:

“We have questioned whether the strategy will achieve any benefits in real terms or whether it is simply a paper exercise...The National Security Strategy does not create new areas of responsibility for the Agencies or the wider intelligence community. The Heads of the Agencies have indicated that they were consulted about the strategy and are broadly supportive of it, but that they do not envisage that it will result in any significant change in direction for them.”

Then there is the National Security Forum. The Committee is clearly ambivalent about its role. It states:

“How the role of the National Security Forum will develop, and what value it will add, remain to be seen.”

Then there is the issue of the Joint Intelligence Committee. The ISC welcomed the separation of the roles of JIC Chairman and Government adviser on intelligence and security matters. However, it said that it was

“disappointed that the grade of both posts was now lower than it had been when they were combined and effectively the position has reverted to its pre-2005 grade”.

The Committee criticised the decision to subsume the role of the head of professional intelligence analysis within the role of JIC Chairman. It said that, given the importance of that role,

“we are very concerned by the plan to subsume it within the Joint Intelligence Committee Chairman’s post as this may actually lessen the priority given to this crucial role.”

Andrew Mackinlay: The hon. Gentleman is referring to paragraphs 134 and 135, which deal with the professional head of intelligence analysis. Paragraph 135 states:

“We are therefore very concerned that the post remained vacant since Jane Knight (the first post-holder) retired in...2007.”

I found it breathtaking that that was not redacted, for reasons of data protection and also because every spook in London now knows who first held the post of professional head of intelligence analysis. The Committee puts that in, but when

“We sincerely hope that lessons have been learnt from the failure and that they will be used when plans for the future are being drawn up.”

The Government must address that as a matter of urgency because, yet again, a major IT project has gone wrong, this time in a secure environment.

On intercept evidence, the Committee says:

“We welcome the fact that the Chilcot conditions meet our concerns that the Agencies’ capability must not be damaged should their intercept material be adduced in court. We are concerned, however, as to whether it will be possible to met these conditions.”

I think that there is a clear case for doing everything we can to ensure that intercept evidence can be used in court, when appropriate, especially given the pressures of the control order regime. We may need to re-examine the conditions to see whether they are right for the circumstances. I appreciate that this is a difficult matter, but it is one in which we should aspire to deliver results and make as much information as possible available, where it is possible to do so.

Finally on the criticisms in the report, the Committee refers to the need to improve understanding of ‘“the path to extremism”’, and it

“welcomes the establishment of a new team analysing open-source and academic material in this field.”

However, it also raised questions about where that sits within the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, and expressed concern about JTAC’s capabilities being diluted by the change. I hope that the Government will look at that very carefully.

My worry, when I look at the Government’s response to the report, is just how limited it is. So many of the responses to the points raised in the report are cursory. Of 17 recommendations, 11 get only a one-line response.

Of course, there are limitations to how much the Government can say in response to the points raised, but surely their response to point F on flooding could be a little more detailed without sacrificing too many secrets. In point H, the Committee considers how oversight of the agencies’ work might be improved, but could the Government not do better than the one-line response that is given? Point N deals with the failings of the SCOPE project: the Government say that they will co-operate with the next report, but could they not say a little more about that?

On the Committee’s final point about intercept evidence, the Government’s response reflects the lengthy process that is being undertaken to enable them to make a decision about its use. The matter is, of course, complex, but it is a shame that the Government did not start the process a long time before they did. If they had, we might have reached a resolution by now.

Briefly, I shall set out for the House some of the areas in which we think improvements need to be made, and where we hope the ISC will apply its efforts to securing improvement. We remain concerned that the “National Security Strategy” is a descriptive document. A proper strategy would set the overall framework and direction for security policy across Government.

We have argued for a proper national security council, rather than an amalgamation of existing Committees. We think that such a council would provide strategic direction and drive national security policy. We need to look carefully at the role and grading of the JIC chair and the security adviser, who both need to have the requisite authority to carry out their important roles.

Richard Ottaway (Croydon, South) (Con): While my hon. Friend is on the question of reform, may I invite him to comment on reform of the Intelligence and Security Committee itself? His predecessor but one, my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis), said that the Committee should be chaired by a member of the Opposition. Is that still our party’s position for the future?

Chris Grayling: First and foremost, I should not wish to cast any aspersions on the role of the current Chairman or his work. My hon. Friend makes a strong case, however, and given that there are a number of Committees that are non-partisan, include Members from all parts of the House and seek to do a proper job for the country, there is a case for having an Opposition Member lead them. I have no particular intention of deviating from the views that my predecessors set out; there is a strong case for what my hon. Friend says. In 12 months’ time, of course, that view may permit the existing Chairman to carry on in his current role.

Although I understand the Government’s aims for the preventing violent extremism programme, my colleagues and I have significant doubts about the effectiveness of many projects and the mechanisms for distributing and monitoring funding. There needs to be a full, evidence-based review of those prevention projects.

Let me conclude as I started by thanking the Committee and our security services for their work. They play a vital role in defending our citizens at home and abroad, and the money that we spend on them is vital. The Committee’s work to ensure that we do the right thing and spend the money in the right ways and places is exceptionally important, but Parliament should be trusted to a greater extent with information about how that is done, even though that move should happen only within clear limits. Fundamentally, however, we will depend on a team of Members from all parts of the House serving on the Committee to ensure that we achieve value for money on behalf of this country’s taxpayers. The Committee members’ role is highly responsible, I thank them for what they have done and I commend them for it.